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INTRODUCTION
In the law review literature on pornography, there is sometimes the
depressing story that either liberalism is limply unhelpful to combat
pornography or, in its role as philosophical handmaiden, liberalism hap-
pily does pornography's bidding) Liberalism as referred to here is not
meant as shorthand for the political ideals of the Democratic Party.
Rather, it is meant to serve as an emblem for a loose collection of com-
mitments to free speech, legal equality, toleration, and limited
government.2 But the description of liberalism that pervades the law re-
view literature on pornography seems exaggerated and far from inevitable.
Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University (Florida). Email: jkang@stu.edu.
B.A., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles;
M.A., Ph.D., University of Michigan. This Article is for Karissa Kang, with hope for
the future.
1. See infia notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
2. The most exemplary advocate of this form of liberalism in our contemporary times is
likely John Rawls. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999);
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996) [hereinafter POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
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Liberalism, as a jurisprudential principle, need not be pornography's
indifferent observer or spineless sycophant; liberalism can be used to
fight pornography. In this Article, I propose to illuminate what appears
to me the most essential aspect of liberalism in its inviolable dedication
to peace and safety. By drawing upon the work of the early liberals, I
argue that liberalism's most basic ethos is conceptually incompatible
with pornography, as the latter celebrates an unjustified form of violence
as its own end.
In Part I of the Article, I briefly define my conception of pornogra-
phy. In Part II, I argue that the conventional criticism of pornography as
conduct, and not speech, is unpersuasive. I then explain in Part III why
the familiar argument against pornography as non-political speech is
also ineffective. As an alternative, I introduce in Part IV the initial com-
ponents of my liberal critique of pornography. I explain how liberalism,
despite its contemporary view as a collection of abstractions about indi-
vidualism and autonomy, finds its most basic and important
commitment in the peace and safety of those in civil society. To develop
this argument, I look to liberalism's origins in Hobbes, Mill, Locke, and
Montesquieu. In Part V, I show that the existing case law of the First
Amendment is informed by liberalism's abiding concern for peace and
safety. Peace and safety, however, must be balanced against the First
Amendment's interest in protecting opportunities for people to arrive at
some truth by being exposed to a diversity of speech. However, I show
in Part VI that conventional arguments to support speech to further
truth cannot be effectively applied to pornography, for pornography's
"truth" of rape, torture, and murder is a threat to a liberal society.
I anticipate that some will discount this argument as an example of
"viewpoint discrimination," the worst form of discrimination in First
Amendment jurisprudence. I respond in Part VII that the charge of
viewpoint discrimination is less a valid objection to a legal argument
than it is recognition of an unavoidable and constituent property within
any legal argument that evokes the First Amendment as a means to chal-
lenge a regulation or to propose an adjudicative principle. To illustrate
my point, I show the conceptual incoherence of Judge Frank Easter-
brook's famous charge of viewpoint discrimination against the
pornography statute endorsed by Andrea Dworkin and Catharine
MacKinnon. Judge Easterbrook's opinion, I argue, does not bypass the
ostensive viewpoint discrimination that he condemns in Dworkin and
MacKinnon. Rather, his attack is itself defined by a form of viewpoint
discrimination, and, thus, he himself implies its logical inevitability.
What is important, then, is not whether a legal proposal is an instance
[Vol. 15:1
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of viewpoint discrimination, but whether the viewpoint discrimination
inherent in the proposal is justified in light of some higher principle.
I. PORNOGRAPHY DEFINED
By "pornography," I do not mean to include any speech that con-
tains explicit or inexplicit sexual material. Rather, I mean a particular
sort of sexual material that is defined by Andrea Dworkin and Catharine
MacKinnon's proposed statute for Indianapolis, which was regrettably
struck down in 1985.' According to Dworkin and MacKinnon, pornog-
raphy is "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether
in pictures or in words, that also includes [presenting women, men,
children, or transsexuals]:"
1) ... as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
2) ... as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in be-
ing raped; or
3) ... as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or
bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or trun-
cated or fragmented or severed into body parts; or
4) ... as being penetrated by objects or animals; or
5) ... in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement, tor-
ture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt
in a context that makes these conditions sexual; or
6) ... as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation,
exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or
positions of servility or submission or display.4
This definition of pornography was rejected by Easterbrook in
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut.5 I will argue later why his justifica-
tions were flawed but, for now, I want to use Dworkin and MacKinnon's
definition in its operative form.
3. Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affid, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
4. Indianapolis, Ind., Code § 16 -3(q)(198 4 ), invalidated by Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d
323.
5. Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d 323.
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II. OBJECTION I: PORNOGRAPHY IS CONDUCT
Some prominent scholars have argued that certain violent pornog-
raphy deserves no constitutional protection, for it is not speech at all but
only conduct. Here, unfortunately, what they consider to be speech is
similar to what Jfirgen Habermas's theory of discourse ethics idealizes it
to be.' That is, they tend to idealize speech as the kind of thing one
finds in a first-year graduate school seminar on political theory where
discussants solemnly offer ideas that are rational, meditative, analytic,
and evidentially sound.7 For example, Cass Sunstein remarks that por-
nography is not really speech because "the 'message' of pornography is
communicated indirectly and not through rational persuasion."' Or
consider Frederick Schauer's argument that pornography should receive
no protection because it is "designed to produce a purely physical ef-
fect."9 On the other end of the political spectrum, one may look to John
Finnis, the natural law philosopher and conservative Catholic, who re-
marks that pornography "pertains, not to the realm of ideas, reason,
intellectual content and truth-seeking, but to the realm of passion, de-
sires, cravings and titillation."'0 And of course Catharine MacKinnon,
the high-profile critic of pornography, argues that pornography is not
6. In saying this, however, I do not mean to disparage Habermas's laudable aspiration to
outline ethics by which diverse parties can agree on dialogue. For representative
scholarship, see 1 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:
REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon
Press 1984) (1981); 2 JfRGEN HABERMAs, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE Ac-
TION: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987)
(1981); JURGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON Dis-
COURSE ETHICS (Ciaran P. Cronin trans., 1995); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Thomas Burger trans.,
2000).
7. They thus tend to diminish the value of those expressions which are emotional,
taunting, empathic and more. See DON HERZOG, POISONING THE MINDS OF THE
LOWER ORDERS 150-68 (1998) (arguing that public debate is and should permit
room for passion, self-interest, and rhetoric, not merely stale impartial logic).
8. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 616-
17 (1986).
9. Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity"' An Exercise in the
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899, 922 (1979) [hereinafter
Schauer, Speech]. See 2 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES FINAL REPORT OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 1275
(1986) ("Obscene materials lack cognitive content .... "); Frederick Schauer, Re-
sponse: Pornography and the First Amendment, 40 U. PIrr. L. REv. 605, 608 n. 14
(1979) ("Direct sexual excitement can hardly be said to contribute to the marketplace
of ideas .... ").
10. John M. Finnis, "Reason and Passion" The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and
Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 222, 227 (1967).
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speech, for it "is largely unconscious and works as primitive conditioning,
with pictures and words as sexual stimuli."'" For her, "[p]ornography con-
sumers are not consuming an idea any more than eating a loaf of bread or
consuming the ideas on its wrapper or the ideas in its recipe." 2 Pornogra-
phy may induce sexual arousal, but MacKinnon rejects the notion that
such effects result from ideas: "Try arguing with a[n] orgasm sometime.
You will find you are no match for the sexual access and power the ma-
terials provide."' 3
I fear that these references to speech as rational and intelligent tend
to suggest, in spite of their advocates' democratic credentials, the air of
the patrician, and, for legal purposes, they tend to exclude categories of
speech that seem meaningful to many members of society (including, I
suspect, some of pornography's critics). 4 While perhaps the furthest cul-
tural analogue to pornography, religion would appear to be another
form of speech that is not necessarily amenable to the qualifications for
speech that pornography's critics have enlisted. Some religions, and per-
haps religion generally, are (as Sunstein says of pornography)
"communicated indirectly;" religious views find expression through par-
ables, sermons, faith and revelation in dreams, and not necessarily
through "rational persuasion." Consider once more this statement by
MacKinnon: "Try arguing with a[n] orgasm sometime. You will find
you are no match for the sexual access and power the materials pro-
vide."' 5 But something similar may be said for religious faith. One does
not and often cannot "argue" for religion in the way that argument is
idealized by MacKinnon, as religious faith is founded on an authority
that is self-referential, mystical, and inherently resistant to secular-
minded standards of evidence and logic. 6 To paraphrase MacKinnon,
you, the secularist, will find you are no match for the divine access and
11. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 16 (1996).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 17.
14. MacKinnon argues that she is not opposed to emotional pleas but the logic of her
arguments would tend to suggest otherwise. See id. at 16.
15. Id. at 17.
16. Consider the greatest story of conversion in Christianity. Saul of Tarsus, persecutor
of Christians, becomes Paul the Apostle, not because of rational or persuasive argu-
ments but because God blinds him with heavenly lights and commands him to
change. Acts 9 (New Int'l Version). In his extensive study, Lewis Rambo observes,
"Many scholars consider Paul's conversion to be the paradigm of the sudden conver-
sion in Christianity." LEwis R. RAMBO, UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS CONVERSION
145 (1995). So, too, John Lofland and Norman Skonovd call Paul's conversion
"mystical" and, in their view, it "has in a sense functioned as the ideal of what con-
version should be in the Western world." John Lofland & Norman Skonovd,
Conversion Motifi, 20 J. ScI. STUD. RELIGION 373, 377 (1981).
2008]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
power that religious materials provide. Indeed, the very reasons that
someone like John Finnis marshals to denounce pornography seem un-
cannily descriptive of the Christianity which he venerates, for
Christianity is replete with biblical stories of those dispositions that Fin-
his associates with pornography in "passion, desire, and craving" by
people lost amidst earthly pleasures as well as those in search of salva-
tion." That the divine objects of such psychological operations
sometimes differ dramatically from pornography's carnal depictions is
beside the point, since what Finnis formally critiques in pornography is
not pornography per se but its shoddy means of communication.
Also problematic, when Schauer ridicules pornography for produc-
ing a "purely physical effect," I find myself wondering what this can
mean." Stated differently, what exactly would be a "purely mental ef-
fect?" The binary, I think, is less turgid than torpid, something that I
can illustrate with the following: When Americans heard the National
Anthem on the first anniversary of September 11, some cried (physically
manifesting tears), others cheered (physically manifesting applause), and
still others, angry at the terrorists or the federal government which po-
tentially bungled an opportunity to preempt their attacks, were filled
with outrage (physically manifesting clenched teeth and fists). Are they
reacting in a physical or mental way? It would seem odd to insist that
they would receive greater First Amendment protection if they would
forego these physical manifestations for silent ruminations accompanied
by blank stares. Or, think of another example: Would Johann Strauss
receive less First Amendment protection if people were inclined to dance
merrily to his waltzes but more if they merely sit and deliberate som-
berly about the alternative to a 3/4 time measure? Or, would a hug or a
kiss from a father to his preschool daughter be less communicative than
a coherent and well-supported five paragraph letter expressing the same
affection? Or, let me return to religion: Would a painting of Mother
17. Recall here that the Bible begins with a story defined by what Professor Finnis calls
"passion, desire, and craving." Indeed, in Eve, Woman becomes gendered as wife,
mother, and object through an act that is rife with the tropes of sexual initiation.
Notwithstanding God's warning that she will die if she even touches the fruit of
knowledge, Eve (although at this point, she technically has no name and is just called
"woman") finds herself consumed with temptation by the serpent to eat of the fruit
because she saw it as "good for food and pleasing to the eye, and also desirable for
gaining wisdom." Genesis 3:2-6 (New Int'l Version). She also gave the fruit to Adam,
and after eating it, they acquired God's knowledge in good and evil and came to
know with embarrassment of their nakedness as a sexualized condition. Genesis 3:6-7
(New Int'l Version). As punishment for her indulgence, God ascribes to her the
properties of her gender: the gift of pain during childbirth and the enmity and violent
abuse of her husband. Acts 3:15-16 (New Int'l Version).
18. Schauer, Speech, supra note 9, at 922.
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Mary receive less protection if it inspires its admirers to weep passion-
ately but more protection if its admirers showed no physical reactions
whatsoever and instead quietly reflected on the subtle play of light and
shadow in the painting's foreground?
These examples suggest, in disquieting terms, that pornography's
critics are troubled less by pornography per se than the physical exhibi-
tion of emotion. There is also an intuitively backward logic to their
definition: They reward speech that is not especially effective as meas-
ured by its failure to impel action (they applaud speech that commends
itself to subsequent review, to further dialogue and negotiation, to more
committee meetings) while disparaging as conduct speech that is effec-
tive (speech that so provokes its audience as to move them physically to
tears, laughter, rage, and frequently in the case of pornography, ecstasy).
Pornography, I would argue, is most definitely speech because it com-
municates a message that produces powerful effects on its audience.
That is a point that is begrudgingly acknowledged by pornogra-
phy's critics. MacKinnon argues that pornography "is masturbation
material" and hence is not speech. She cites for support Aristotle's obser-
vation that "'it is impossible to think about anything while absorbed [in
the pleasures of sex].' '... She notes, too, that the "Yiddish equivalent
translates roughly as 'a stiff prick turns the mind to shit."'20 But to
summon these epigrams for the proposition that pornography is not
speech is questionable. For they can be marshaled for precisely the oppo-
site conclusion. If pornography were merely conduct and lacked all
communicative properties, it could not exercise such powers of emula-
tion or arousal in its audience. It could not so distract Aristotle or so
turn a Yiddish-speaking man's 'mind to shit.' Far from denying pornog-
raphy First Amendment protection, such powerful effects on the
audience would seem to be a potential reason for bestowing it protec-
tion.
III. OBJECTION II: PORNOGRAPHY Is NOT POLITICAL SPEECH
Pornography's critics argue that if pornography must be considered
speech, it certainly cannot be considered political speech, which is tradi-
tionally afforded the highest protection by the Supreme Court. Rather,
19. MAcKINNON, supra note 11, at 17.
20. Id.
20081
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they argue, pornography is low-value speech that deserves correspond-
ingly low-value protection.21
In making this argument, pornography's critics invoke the Supreme
Court's practice of affording different degrees of protection to speech
based on its content. Some forms of speech-commercial speech, pro-
fanity, and libel, for instance-are considered "low value" and hence
receive correspondingly low protection, while political speech is ranked
highest and thus considered deserving of highest protection.22 Some jus-
tices have offered support for this view. Writing for a plurality, Justice
Stevens explained in Young v. American Mini- Theatres:23
A remark attributed to Voltaire characterizes our zealous ad-
herence to the principle that the government may not tell the
citizen what he may or may not say. Referring to a suggestion
that the violent overthrow of tyranny might be legitimate, he
said: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the
death your right to say it." The essence of that comment has
been repeated time after time in our decisions invalidating at-
tempts by the government to impose selective controls upon
the dissemination of ideas.24
However, Justice Stevens refused to provide similar protection to
erotic speech:
21. Elizabeth Spahn, On Sex and Violence, 20 NEw ENG. L. Rav. 629, 638-39 (1984-
85) (arguing that pornography is not political speech); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography
and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 602 ("Although the harms generated
by pornography are serious, they are insufficient, standing alone, to justify regulation
under the usual standards applied to political speech."); Martin Karo & Marcia
McBrian, Note, The Lessons of Miller and Hudnut: On Proposing a Pornography Ordi-
nance That Passes Constitutional Muster, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 179, 201 (1989)
(arguing that pornography is not political speech).
22. Writing in 1988, Laurence Tribe explains in his magisterial constitutional law treatise
that "the Court is beginning to construct a multi-level edifice with several intermedi-
ate categories of less-than-complete constitutional protection for certain kinds of
expression." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 930 (2nd ed.
1988). Tribe continues, "These new categories include commercial speech, near-
obscene and offensive speech, non-obscene child pornography, defamation, and pos-
sibly the speech of public employees." Id. For authority discussing, in part, the
Supreme Court's recognition of low-value protection, see also Arnold H. Loewy, The'
Use, Nonuse, and Misuse of Low Value Speech, 58 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 195 (2001);
Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REv. 297 (1995);
Christopher M. Schultz, Note, Content-Based Restrictions on Free Expression Reevalu-
ating the High Versus Low Value Speech Distinction, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 573 (1999).
23. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
24. Id. at 63 (citation omitted).
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[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will
not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have
some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society's interest
in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different,
and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled politi-
cal debate that inspired Voltaire's immortal comment.
Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us
to applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can
understand why our duty to defend the right to speak remains
the same. But few of us would march our sons and daughters
off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual
Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice. Even though
the First Amendment protects communication in this area
from total suppression, we hold that the State may legitimately
use the content of these materials as the basis for placing them
in a different classification from other motion pictures."
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,26 the plurality opinion similarly ob-
served "that nude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is
expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment,
though we view it as only marginally So.",27 From this distinction, one
might argue that pornography hardly qualifies as political speech and
thus deserves, at most, low-value protection.
But it is dubious to suggest that speech which is erotic in content
lacks the requisite properties to merit the status of political speech.
There is a fairly straightforward criticism available in the observation
that any legislative bill that regulates sexuality or gender is passed (or
not) partly because of certain ideas regarding sexuality or gender. And
such ideas are partly influenced by, or at least certainly reflected in,
speech that is erotic. Thus, one can argue that erotic speech can inform
or reflect how we view men's and women's gender roles, and that such
views can affect how we think about statutes concerning sexual harass-
ment, gender discrimination, same-sex education, rape statutes, and
gender-based affirmative action. Consider, too, how one strand of
MacKinnon's criticism of pornography relies on the claim that pornog-
raphy can shape our very ideas of gender: "Gender is sexual.
Pornography constitutes the meaning of that sexuality. Men treat
women as whom they see women as being. Pornography constructs who
25. Young, 427 U.S. at 70-71.
26. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
27. Id. at 566.
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that is. Men's power over women means that the way men see women
defines who women can be. Pornography is that way."28
Similarly, Andrea Dworkin writes that the "major theme of pornog-
raphy as a genre is male power."29 If that is true (and it is difficult to see
how pornography, at least the sort condemned by Dworkin and
MacKinnon, is not), then pornography would also seem to reflect and
reinforce notions of gender roles and, therefore, reflect and reinforce a
myriad of political issues that are informed by issues of gender roles.
Indeed, the line between political speech and pornography becomes
paradoxically blurrier the more that feminists insist that it is dangerous
and animated by misogyny. MacKinnon attempts to reorient the reader
to treat pornography as an expression of male domination but, in doing
so, she also awkwardly characterizes pornography as either a reflection or
reinforcement of a certain form of "politics," and thus, by implication,
as a form of political speech. Consider her litany of descriptions: "por-
nography is a political practice, '30 "[p]ornography identifies a political
practice that is predicated on power and powerlessness-a practice that
is, in fact, legally protected,"3 and "[p]ornography, in the feminist view,
is a form of forced sex, a practice of sexual politics, an institution of gen-
der inequality. 32 Given these deliberate descriptions of pornography as
political in its meaning, pornography's critics encounter difficulty in also
condemning it as undeserving of the status of political speech in the law.
IV. LIBERALISM'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND SAFETY
Thus far, I have identified two broad objections with the current
content-based criticisms of pornography: They fail to show that pornog-
raphy is not speech, and they fail to show that it is non-political speech.
There is a way, however, to overcome the problems that attend both ob-
jections. I want to identify and develop a liberal theory of pornography
which denies pornography, as I have defined that term, constitutional
protection because it threatens liberalism's most important philosophical
dedication in peace and safety. Specifically, my argument will be that
pornography should receive no constitutional protection because it ap-
provingly depicts forms of violence which are hostile to liberalism's most
basic goal of people's peace and safety, and, to that extent, tends to lack
28. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, 197
(1989).
29. ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 24 (1991).
30. MacKinnon, supra note 28, at 196 (emphasis added).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
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the capacity to contribute to some "truth." In this way, my aim to define
pornography as undeserving of First Amendment protection reflects the
structure of those conventional legal arguments against granting consti-
tutional protection to obscenity and fighting words. The Court has
denied constitutional protection to these latter categories because they,
too, present some harm to society and lack redeeming values for public
discourse.
In developing my thesis, I am bound to meet resistance from some
critics of liberalism who will say that liberalism cannot possibly be con-
scripted to deny pornography First Amendment protection. If anything,
they will say that liberalism serves as pornography's philosophical ac-
complice by refusing to do anything. The indictment that liberalism
serves as pornography's silent handmaiden is surprisingly prevalent in
the law review literature. Sometimes liberalism is portrayed as gleefully
optimistic about men's propensity for mature disengagement from por-
nography's violent misogyny:
Liberalism assumes that consumers of pornography distinguish
between reality and pornographic fantasy and will not be
moved to try a particular antisocial act merely because they
have seen the act represented in pornography. The feminist
critique directly contradicts this liberal assumption.
33
So, too, the self-described radical feminist MacKinnon indicts what
she perceives as liberalism's socially irresponsible preoccupation with free
speech:
The liberal theory underlying First Amendment law further be-
lieves that free speech, including pornography, helps discover
33. Jeffrey G. Shaman, Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. REv.
661, 667 (1995). The following remarks are also revealing:
Underlying the liberal opposition to the feminist pornography proposal
may be more than just discomfort with degree. Liberals, generally, have not
viewed the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance as a step in the right direction
that simply goes too far. Rather, they have attacked it outright. This may
be because on the topics of sexuality and pornography, feminists and liber-
als begin their thinking from strongly divergent assumptions.
Feminists see depictions of sexuality, if not sexuality itself, as dominated by
inequality and politics. Liberals begin with the idea that sexuality and de-
pictions of it are essentially liberating, healthy, and probably apolitical.
William K. Layman, Note, Violent Pornography and the Obscenity Doctrine: The Road
Not Taken, 75 GEo. L.J. 1475, 1505-06 (1987).
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truth. Censorship, in its view, restricts society to partial
truths ...
To liberals, speech must never be sacrificed for other social
goals. But liberalism has never understood that free speech of
men silences the free speech of women. 4
Other times liberalism is described as single-mindedly numb to the
welfare of women:
Legal liberalism views pornography in the context of freedom
of speech and individual autonomy, whereas radical feminism
sees pornography as dehumanizing traffic in women that sets
the standard for mistreatment of women, engendering "rape,
sexual abuse of children, battery, forced prostitution, and sex-
ual murder."... The attempts of radical feminism to restrict
pornography have fallen victim to the dominant forces of legal
liberalism that pervade our legal system's approach to speech
issues."
To this picture of a liberalism obsessed with individual autonomy,
there is also the paradoxical charge that liberalism fails to intervene
against pornography because it has no idea what it wants to do:
[L]iberal legalism is not persuasive on the legal and ethical is-
sues surrounding the commodification of women's bodies by
pornography and prostitution. This results from liberalism's
uncertainty about which constitutional values are normatively
superior: rational personhood values such as free speech and
moral agnosticism, or embodiment values such as bodily in-
violability and non-commodification.36
What becomes lost in these criticisms is how liberalism can con-
tribute to peace and safety generally, including the peace and safety of
34. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 155-56 (1987). MacKinnon
also writes: "Sexual liberation in the liberal sense frees male sexual aggression in the
feminist sense. What looks like love and romance in the liberal view looks a lot like
hatred and torture in the feminist view." Id. at 149. See also MacKinnon, Not a Moral
Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y Rav. 321, 322-24 (1984) (distinguishing "the male morality
of liberalism and obscenity law from a feminist political critique of pornography").
35. William J. Turnier, Pamela Johnston Conover & David Lowery, Redistributive Justice
and Cultural Feminism, 45 Am. U. L. REv. 1275, 1297 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
36. Peter Halewood, Law's Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal Property
Rights, 81 lowA L. REv. 1331, 1347-48 (1996).
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women who, as a class, are potentially threatened by pornography. At its
heart, I argue, liberalism sought to establish peace and safety as the most
important goals for civil society-hardly self-evident ends to many who
hated liberalism when it was nascent (or, even now, if one cares to look
around most places in the world, with its civil wars, ethnic genocide,
and violent religious fanaticism). The primary purpose of a liberal soci-
ety has been to maintain peace and to protect the personal safety of its
members." It is an aspiration that stems significantly from the horrors
experienced in early modern Europe by concerted attempts to cultivate
virtue, or more precisely, some religious fanatics' ideal of virtue, which
has engendered intolerance, paranoia, torture, and civil war." As the
political theorist Judith Shklar aptly notes, "[t]his is a liberalism that was
born out of the cruelties of the religious civil wars, which forever ren-
dered the claims of Christian charity a rebuke to all religious institutions
and parties. If the faith was to survive at all, it would do so privately."39
Hence, we live in a "liberalism of fear, which makes cruelty the first
vice."40 To be sure, Christianity and other religions also stress the virtue
of rejecting physical cruelty, but "to put it/rst does place one irrevoca-
bly outside the sphere of revealed religion."
This aspiration for a peaceful and safe civil society informs my ar-
guments regarding pornography legislation. Common objections to
pornography legislation become unpersuasive when seen in light of lib-
eralism's most fundamental commitment to peace and safety.
Specifically, I tackle objections from what I call truth and viewpoint dis-
crimination. I argue that the conventional legal categories of "speech" or
"political speech," while not in exclusive furtherance of liberalism's most
basic enterprise, should be significantly informed by it rather than trying
to assume an ontological existence independent of the political structure
in which they operate.
37. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 7-45 (1984); ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERAL-
ISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14-15, 18-19 (1990).
38. See SHKLAR, supra note 37.
39. Id. at 5.
40. Id. at 8-9.
41. Id. at 9. Shklar also remarks:
When [physical cruelty] is marked as the supreme evil it is judged so in and
of itself, and not because it signifies a denial of God or any other higher
norm. It is a judgment made from within the world in which cruelty oc-
curs as part of our normal private life and our daily public practices. By
putting it unconditionally first, with nothing above us to excuse or to for-
give acts of cruelty, one closes off any appeal to any order other than that
of actuality.
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A. Hobbes
No more emphatic case can be made for liberalism's preoccupation
with peace and safety than Thomas Hobbes's grand account in Levia-
than.42 By turning first to a proto-liberal in Hobbes,43 I can illustrate my
case that liberalism's political origins begin with a philosophical disposi-
tion that favors societal peace and the safety of its members. Hobbes's
case for a civil society dedicated to peace and safety hinges on juxtapos-
ing a state of nature where he imagines what life would look like if
devoid of a stable sovereign who enjoys the absolute authorization of his
subjects. The state of nature is premised on the view that "[n]ature hath
made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind" such that "the
weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination, or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger
with himself."" To this equality of ability in natural man is a deeply un-
social (and some may say antisocial) disposition that precluded trust and
mutual accommodation; men fought for "competition," "diffidence"
and "glory."45 Therefore, in the state of nature, Hobbes tells us, "without
a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition
which is called war, and such war as is of every man against every,,46 ,
man. And, "worst of all," the state of nature is characterized by "con-
tinual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short."47
Because of the fear of violent death, men in the state of nature de-
rive "law[s] of nature," with a law of nature understood as "a precept or
general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do
that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means of preserv-
ing the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best
preserved."48 A law of nature thus is not a "law" in the conventional
42. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: WITH SELECTED VARIANTS FROM THE LATIN EDITION
OF 1668 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1994) (1668).
43. I am mindful that some may resist calling Hobbes a liberal at all. See, e.g., DON
HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 146-47 (1989) (arguing
that Hobbes was not a liberal because he failed to accommodate role differentiation).
I still believe that Hobbes can be conscripted as a proto-liberal to the extent that he
advocated peace and safety as principal aims of a civil society. See John M. Kang, The
Uses of Insincerity: Thomas Hobbes's Theory of Law and Society, 15 L. & LIT. 371
(2003).
44. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 74.
45. Id. at 76.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 79.
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sense but "conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the
conservation and defence of themselves." 9 The first and most funda-
mental law of nature, for Hobbes, is to seek peace:
And because the condition of man.., is a condition of war of
everyone against everyone (in which case everyone is governed
by his own reason and there is nothing he can make use of
that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against
his enemies), it followeth that in such a condition every man
has a right to everything, even to one another's body. And
therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every-
thing endureth, there can be no security to any man (how
strong or wise soever he be) of living out the time which na-
ture ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a
precept, or general rule, or reason that every man ought to en-
deavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it, and when
he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and ad-
vantages of war. The first branch of which rule containeth the
first and fundamental law of nature, which is to seek peace, and
follow it. °
This first law of nature functionally determines the content of
Hobbes's other laws of nature." Accordingly, the second law of nature
commands that "a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as
for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down
this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against
other men, as he would allow other men against himself."52 Under the
third law of nature, "we are obliged to transfer to another such rights as,
being retained, hinder the peace of mankind."" And because men form a
covenant by which such rights are transferred, Hobbes states that the third
law of nature requires that "men perform their covenants made, without
49. Id. at 100.
50. Id. at 80 (first and second emphases removed).
51. Hobbes writes: "the laws of nature are immutable and eternal; for injustice, ingrati-
tude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made
lawful. For it can never be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it." Id. at
99-100. Hobbes also explains, "the laws of nature dictating peace for a means of the
conservation of men in multitudes; and which only concern the doctrine of civil soci-
ety. There be other things tending to the destruction of particular men (as
drunkenness and all other parts of intemperance), which may therefore also be reck-
oned amongst those things which the law of nature hath forbidden; but are not
necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place." Id. at 99.
52. Id. at 80 (emphasis and footnote removed).
53. Id. at 89.
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which covenants are in vain, and but empty words, and the right of all
men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war."
54
Hobbes's obsession with peace and safety also inform his curious
definitions of terms familiar to us. In his fourth law of nature, he urges
men to show gratitude to each other: "A man which receiveth benefit
from another of mere grace endeavour that he which giveth it have no
reasonable cause to repent him of his good will." 5 The reason for doing so
is not primarily to be nice, but to bolster those relations conducive to
peace and safety:
For no man giveth but with intention of good to himself, be-
cause gift is voluntary, and of all voluntary acts the object is to
every man his own good; of which, if men see they shall be frus-
trated, there will be no beginning of benevolence or trust; nor,
consequently, of mutual help, nor of reconciliation of one man
to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condi-
tion of war, which is contrary to the first and fundamental law
of nature, which commandeth men to seek peace.56
Like the injunction to show gratitude, the injunction to accommo-
date others is motivated by Hobbes's abiding interest in peace:
A fifth law of nature is complaisance, that is to say, that every
man strive to accommodate himself to the rest.... For as that
stone which ... takes more room from others than itself fills,
and (for the hardness) cannot be easily made plain, and thereby
hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofit-
able and troublesome, so also a man that (by asperity of nature)
will strive to retain those things which to himself are superflu-
ous and to others necessary, and (for the stubbornness of his
passions) cannot be corrected, is to be left or cast out of society
as cumbersome thereunto.57
There are fourteen other laws of nature, and all of them individually and
collectively reinforce the first and fundamental law of nature to seek
58peace.
54. Id. (emphasis removed).
55. Id. at 95 (emphasis removed).
56. Id. (emphasis removed).
57. Id.
58. Those laws of nature which are most obviously conducive to peace are as follows:
The sixth law of nature "is this that upon caution of the future time, a man ought
to pardon the offences past of them that, repenting desire it. For pardon is nothing but
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At this point, the reader may wonder whether I am oversimplifying
liberalism as a reductive Hobbesian obsession with peace and safety. Is
not liberalism, you might ask, also about individual freedom and tolera-
tion? It is, but in the next section, I show why these two concepts can be
underwritten by and conducive to peace and safety, rather than simply
compete as independent categories.
granting of peace, which (though granted to them that persevere in their hostility be
not peace but fear, yet) not granted to them that give caution of the future time is
sign of an aversion to peace; and therefore contrary to the law of nature." Id. at 96.
The seventh law of nature "is that in revenges (that is, retribution of evil for evil)
men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow....
Revenge without respect to the example and profit to come is a triumph, or glorying,
in the hurt of another, tending to no end . . . and glorying to no end is vain-glory,
and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason tendeth to the introduction of
war, which is against the law of nature, and is commonly styled by the name of cru-
elty." Id.
The eighth law of nature is that "no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture,
declare hatred or contempt of another," for "all signs of hatred or contempt provoke to
fight, insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life than not to be re-
venged." Id.
The ninth law of nature is that "every man acknowledge other for his equal by na-
ture," for invidious aspersions against another's lack of talent or ability tends to cause
fights. Id. at 97.
The tenth law of nature is that "at the entrance into conditions of peace, no man
require to reserve to himself any right which he is not content should be reserved to every
one of the rest," for this threatens societal peace. Id.
The eleventh law of nature is that "if a man be trusted to judge between man and
man, it is a precept of the law of nature that he deal equally between them. For without
that, the controversies of men cannot be determined but by war." Id.
The twelfth law of nature is that "such things as cannot be divided be enjoyed in
common, if it can be .... For otherwise the distribution is unequal, and contrary to
equity," and thus tends to undermine peace. Id.
The fifteenth law of nature is that "all men that mediate peace be allowed safe
conduct. For the law that commandeth peace, as the end, commandeth intercession, as
the means; and to intercession the means is safe conduct." Id. at 98.
The sixteenth law of nature is that "they that are at controversy, submit their right
to the judgment ofan arbitrator," for "unless the parties to the question covenant mu-
tually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as far from peace as ever." Id.
The seventeenth law of nature is that "no man is afit arbitrator in his own cause,
and if he were never so fit, yet (equity allowing to each party equal benefit) if one be
admitted to be judge, the other is to be admitted also; and so the controversy, that is,
the cause of war, remains, against the law of nature." Id.
The eighteenth law of nature is that "no man in any cause ought to be received
for arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth out of
the victory of one party, than of the other; for he hath taken ... a bribe; and no man
can be obliged to trust him." Id. The justification for this law of nature is "the same
reason no man in any cause ought to be received for arbitrator." Id.
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B. Mill and Locke
A closer inspection of liberalism would reveal that toleration, a
cornerstone of liberalism," is itself dependent upon the more basic
value of peace and safety. John Stuart Mill's plea for toleration
provides a useful illustration. Mill conventionally exists in the imagi-
nation of the Supreme Court as the proto-libertarian who bravely
embraced the pursuit of truth, not the banalities of peace and safety,
as a worthy liberal goal.60 But this would be to ignore Mill's harm
principle which forms a constitutive part of his account of toleration.
He states:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individu-
ally or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of
any of their number, is self-protection. That the only pur-
pose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to pre-
vent harm to others.61
Like Hobbes, then, Mill too is conspicuously concerned with
physical harm. Specifically, one can argue that the liberty extolled by
Mill is itself underwritten by a dedication to protect people's peace
and safety regardless of their expressed views. So Shklar observes that
"[c]ruelty, to begin with, is often utterly intolerable for liberals, be-/ ,,62
cause fear destroys freedom. Without fear that others will physically
punish what they regard as burning impieties, one may deliver pro-
vocative and offensive opinions or embark on what Mill called
"experiments in living" by exploring alternative lifestyles. 63 Here,
59. For a discussion of toleration within the liberal tradition, see, e.g., DAVID A.J. RICH-
ARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE
TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986); HERZOG, supra note 43, at 148-8 1.
60. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); Holder v. Hall,
512 U.S. 874, 901 (1994); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 189 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 392 (1969); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272, 279 (1964);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514-15 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 151 (1959) (Black & Douglas, JJ., and Warren, C.J.,
dissenting); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 242 (1951).
61. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1995) (1859).
62. SHKLAR, supra note 37, at 2.




Shklar's remark is telling. She argues that liberalism does not pose a
tension between "classical virtue" and "liberal self-indulgence" but,
between cruel military and moral repression and violence, and
a self-restraining tolerance that fences in the powerful to pro-
tect the freedom and safety of every citizen, old or young, male
or female, black or white. Far from being an amoral free-for-
all, liberalism is, in fact, extremely difficult and constraining,
far too much so for those who cannot endure contradiction,
complexity, diversity, and the risks of freedom. 6'
But toleration was not simply underwritten by liberalism's com-
mitment to peace and safety; the former also helped to underwrite the
latter. The most explicit version of this argument for toleration comes
from John Locke. Locke's statements constitute arguably the single most
important work on liberalism's understanding of toleration, certainly up
to his own time. Like Hobbes, Locke attempts to establish peace and
safety among members of civil society for he too was living in politically
violent times.65 He presents a law of nature whose first object is to "wil-
leth the Peace and Preservation of all Mankind.... 66 However, whereas
Hobbes proposed the creation of a sovereign with nearly absolute au-
thorization from his subjects to do whatever he thinks necessary for
peace and safety, Locke argues that to establish peace and safety the sov-
ereign must tolerate dissenters and those who subscribe to competing
cultural beliefs. Locke observes:
The magistrate is afraid of other Churches, but not of his own;
because he is kind and favourable to the one, but severe and
cruel to the other.... Let him turn the Tables: Or let those
Dissenters enjoy but the same Privileges in Civils as his other
Subjects, and he will quickly find that these Religious Meetings
will be no longer dangerous. For if men enter into Seditious
Conspiracies, 'tis not Religion that inspires them to it in their
Meetings; but their Sufferings and Oppressions that make them
willing to ease themselves. Just and moderate Governments are
64. SHI.AR, supra note 37, at 5.
65. SMITH, supra note 37, at 18. Locke states that "I no sooner perceived myself in the
world, but I found myself in a storm which has lasted almost hitherto." Id.
66. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690) (emphasis removed). The state of nature has a "Law of Nature to
govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Man-
kind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to
harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions." Id.
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every where quiet, every where safe. But Oppression raises
Ferments, and makes men struggle to cast off an uneasie and
tyrannical Yoke.67
Locke concludes succinctly that "some enter into Company for
Trade and Profit: Others, for want of Business.... But there is one only
thing which gathers People into Seditious Commotions, and that is Op-
pression. 68 Locke tried to establish toleration by inserting a dichotomy
between the religious sphere of faith and the civil sphere of government,
something that appears to us living three hundred years later as probably
intuitively right and finding general expression in the First Amend-
ment's religion clauses, although the separation was hardly consideredS69
obvious by Locke's contemporaries. He announces that his purpose is
to "distinguish exactly the Business of Civil Government from that of
Religion, and to settle the just Bounds that lie between the one and the
other," for if "this be not done, there can be no end put to the Contro-
versies that will be always arising, between those that have, or at least
pretend to have, on the one side, a Concernment for the Interest of
Mens Souls, and on the other side, a Care of the Commonwealth.,
70
From this premise, Locke begins to elaborate on his general point that
"the care of Souls is not committed to the Civil Magistrate, any more
than to other Men." 71 But the civil magistrate is entitled to regulate
"civil interests" which Locke defines as those pertaining to "Life, Liberty,
Health, and Indolency of Body; and the Possession of outward things,
such as Money, Lands, Houses, Furniture, and the like., 72 By keeping
separate these two spheres, Locke hoped to create a condition of tolera-
tion that would preempt conflicts among religionists and thus benefit
the cause of peace and safety.
Rogers Smith argues that Locke never insisted on peace and safety
as overriding goals. Smith argues instead the purpose of government for
Locke is to protect men's property and that failure to do so would justify
67. JOHN LocKE, A LETrER CONCERNING TOLERATION 52 (James H. Tully ed., Hackett
Publishing Co. 1983) (1689).
68. Id.
69. See HERZOG, supra note 43, at 162-81. Liberalism's desire to dichotomize contexts
into public and private is not exclusive to Locke, of course. See SHrcAR, supra note
37, at 5: "This is a liberalism that was born out of the cruelties of the religious civil
wars, which forever rendered the claims of Christian charity a rebuke to all religious
institutions and parties. If the faith was to survive at all, it would do so privately." See
also RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at xxvi-xxix.





revolution, and hence justify violence." But that reading requires some
qualification, for Locke defines property broadly, as including one's
body and therefore the right to property also includes a right to peace
and safety in one's person. 4 Furthermore, Locke seems unable or unwill-
ing to imagine a situation in which government would be protective of
men's bodies but not their property; if government is not protective of
the latter, Locke appears to believe that it will hardly care to protect the
former, since protection for both derives from an absence of a rule of
law which places formal limits on the government.75 The desire for peace
and safety is, therefore, more consonant with the desire for property
than might first appear in Locke's arguments.
But while Locke argued for the division of religious and govern-
mental spheres, how does an internal arrangement of government itself
affect toleration and its relationship to peace and safety in a liberal soci-
ety? I turn to that question next in my discussion of Montesquieu.
C Montesquieu
Montesquieu, the liberal cited most often in the Federalist Papers,
also placed a premium on peace and safety. He begins his argument by
stipulating that there are "relations of fairness prior to the positive law
that establishes them . . . ."" So, for instance, "if there were intelligent
beings that had received some kindness from another being, they ought
to be grateful for it . . . ."" Montesquieu seeks to derive these "relations
of fairness" by considering "man before the establishment of societies"
and the "laws he would receive in such a state will be the laws of na-
ture."7 8 Similar to Hobbes and to a lesser extent Locke, Montesquieu
describes a state of nature characterized by a fear of violent death. He
states that man in the state of nature:
would think of the preservation of his being before seeking the
origin of his being. Such a man would at first feel only his
weakness; his timidity would be extreme: and as for evidence,
73. ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 14-15, 18-19
(1990).
74. Locke writes that "every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any
Right to but himself." LOCKE, supra note 66, at 287.
75. It is worth considering here Locke's discussion of slavery. Id. at 284-85.
76. CHARI.ES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 4
(Anne M. Cohler et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (1748).
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. at 4, 6.
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if it is needed on this point, savages have been found in forests;
everything makes them tremble, everything makes them flee.79
Given this natural fear, Montesquieu believes that men in the state
of nature "would not seek to attack one another," and would infer that
"peace would be the first natural law."8° In saying this, he differs from
Hobbes who argues that man is not naturally fearful but acquires such
fear by having confronted or contemplated the prospect of violent
death.81 Montesquieu also differs from Hobbes in suggesting that the
"state of war" is not coexistent with the state of nature but begins in civil
society: "As soon as men are in society, they lose their feeling of weak-
ness; the equality that was among them ceases, and the state of war
begins." 82 What displaces men's initial fear is an ambition borne of con-
fidence in one's individual abilities such that "individuals within each
society begin to feel their strength; they seek to turn their favor [sic] the
principal advantages of this society, which brings about a state of war
among them."83 This state of war "bring[s] about the establishment of
laws among men.,84
But the character and purpose of these laws are not the same for all
peoples.8 5 While Montesquieu says that expansion "was the purpose of
Rome; war, that of Lacedaemonia ... commerce, that of Marseilles,"
there is "one nation in the world whose constitution has political liberty
for its direct purpose."8 6 Here, Montesquieu had in mind England, 7 but
what he says of its constitution could just as easily apply to our own
American constitution. Montesquieu illustrates how liberalism can con-
ceive "political liberty" as intimately connected to peace and safety.88
"Political liberty in a citizen is that tranquility of spirit which comes
from the opinion each one has of his security, and in order for him to
have this liberty the government must be such that one citizen cannot
fear another citizen." 9 The separation of governmental powers is, for
79. Id. at 6.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 7.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Montesquieu writes: "Laws should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are
made that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit another." Id. at 8.
86. Id. at 156.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 156-57.
89. Id. at 157.
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Montesquieu, its most celebrated proponent, a means to prevent the fear
on the part of citizens arising from threats to their peace and safety:
When legislative power is united with executive power in a
single person or in a single body of the magistracy, there is no
liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate
that makes tyrannical laws will execute them tyrannically.
Nor is there liberty if the power of judging is not separate
from legislative power and from executive power. If it were
joined to legislative power, the power over the life and liberty
of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the
legislator. If it were joined to executive power, the judge could
have the force of an oppressor.0
Montesquieu observes how in "most kingdoms in Europe, the gov-
ernment is moderate because the prince, who has the first two powers,
leaves the exercise of the third to his subjects," but in the Italian repub-
lics, where the three powers are united, "to maintain itself, the
government needs means as violent as in the government of the Turks;
witness the state inquisitors and the lion's maw into which an informer
can, at any moment, throw his note of accusation."" Montesquieu con-
tinues that, in these republics, the "body of the magistracy, as executor
of the laws, retains all the power it has given itself as legislator" and it
can "destroy each citizen by using its particular wills."' 2 For Montes-
quieu, then, political liberty is not inconsistent with peace and safety,
and a liberal republic whose governmental structure is based on a separa-
tion of powers can help to sustain the latter.
What I have tried to establish by my discussion of Montesquieu,
Locke, Mill, and Hobbes has been the view that liberalism is founded
principally on a dedication to people's peace and safety, and that even
those concepts like political liberty and toleration which by contemporary
convention attach to liberalism are underwritten by or in furtherance of
this most basic commitment. A liberal society is dedicated to values other
than peace and safety. Even Hobbes lamented the state of nature, not just
for its fear of violent death, but for all those other things which fear of
violent death made impossible. "In such condition," he wrote, "there is no
place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently,
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may be imported by sea, no commodious building, . .. no knowledge of
the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society
.... "" And in our contemporary world, some have argued that liberal
society is dedicated to other values, most importantly the pursuit of
truth through a theoretically free public discourse." However, one may
say with some confidence that whereas a liberal society might theoreti-
cally exist without legal protection for the pursuit of some truth, it
cannot exist without peace and safety. 5 Lest liberalism's concern for
peace and safety seem too abstract, one should recall the warring nobles
and religious zealots in the English civil war of Hobbes's day. 6 Such men
had quite distinct ideas about "truth" that were incompatible with peace
and safety.'7 Theirs was a "politics" that was fully coherent and persua-
sive to many but it was not politics according to liberalism for it
eschewed the basic requirement of peace and safety.
But is this philosophical justification from liberalism compatible
with the existing case law? I address that question in the next section.
V. FROM PHILOSOPHY TO CASE LAW
In this section, I will argue that the account of liberalism that I
have offered is not only theoretically compatible with the case law, but
93. HOBBES, supra note 42, at 76.
94. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First AmendmentJusti-
fication, 30 GA. L. Rav. 1, 1 (1995) ("The most influential argument supporting the
constitutional commitment to freedom of speech is the contention that speech is
valuable because it leads to the discovery of truth."). Frederick Schauer has also
commented: "Throughout the ages many diverse arguments have been employed to
attempt to justify a principle of freedom of speech. Of all these, the predominant and
most persevering has been the argument that free speech is particularly valuable be-
cause it leads to the discovery of truth." FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15 (1982). Lee Bollinger writes:
In today's discourse about free speech, the dominant value associated with
speech is its role in getting at the truth, or the advancement of knowledge.
Speech is the means by which people convey information and ideas, by
which they communicate viewpoints and propositions and hypotheses,
which can then be tested against the speech of others. Through the process
of open discussion we find out what others think on the same issues. The
end result of this process, we hope, is that we will arrive at as close an ap-
proximation of the truth as we can.
BOLLINGER, supra note 59, at 45.
95. Hobbes appears to allude to this idea in his famous description of the state of nature.
HOBBES, supra note 42, at 76.




that the existing case law embodies liberalism's commitment to peace
and safety. What is required, then, is not a wholesale abandonment of
the present case law in favor of a transcendent philosophical substitute,
but, rather, a reflective aspiration to develop the potential already immi-
nent in the law.
To strengthen my argument, I draw upon cases from different do-
mains of First Amendment jurisprudence: politically subversive speech,
fighting words, and group libel. The cases suggest that the Supreme
Court has never understood the Constitution as permitting the speaking
of "truth" at the expense of peace and safety.
A. Politically Subversive Speech
In cases dealing with subversive speech, that is, speech that either
directly or indirectly tries to undermine the present government's power
or authority, what contemporary scholars and judges tend to emphasize
is the capacious right of free speech gradually created by the Supreme
Court's doctrine of clear and present danger. What garners relatively less
attention is how the doctrine appears to make peace and safety a nonne-
gotiable end of civil society. In Schenck v. United States, where Justice
Holmes first introduced the clear and present danger doctrine,98 Amer-
ica was combating Germany in World War I and Congress had
instituted a draft to ensure a steady supply of troops.99 Defendants dis-
tributed a leaflet calling for resistance to the draft for which they were
prosecuted under the Espionage Act of 1918.00 Narrowly construed, the
issue in the case was whether Congress had the right to prohibit the de-
fendants' speech in order to further the draft, a question that Holmes
answered in the affirmative.' 1 More broadly, the case spoke to liberal-
ism's commitment to protect peace and safety, as implied by Holmes's
famous dictum that "[t]he most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing
a panic."' 2 What is worth emphasis in the statement is that Holmes's
commitment to peace and safety, while potentially flexible enough to
accommodate speech that presents a certain risk to peace and safety,
98. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
99. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49.
100. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49-50.
101. Holmes wrote that the "question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
102. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
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seems ultimately nonnegotiable as a matter of principle. It is a position
that finds support from his subsequent pronouncement in Schenck that
the "most stringent protection of free speech . . . does not even protect a
man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the
effect of force.",
0 3
To be sure, Holmes did not shy away from the radical political ex-
perimentation that could be theoretically sparked by free speech.
Responding in Gitlow v. New York to potential critics that incitement to
violence differs from speech, Holmes announces with characteristic
aplomb that "[e]very idea is an incitement"'0 4 and that the "only differ-
ence between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the
narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result."' 5 For Holmes,
as long as the speech does not pose a clear and present danger, its effects,
however undesirable to some, cannot be prohibited: "If, in the long run,
the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be ac-
cepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of
free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their,, 106
way. Despite the indifferent bravado of these pronouncements,
Holmes never relinquishes his commitment to peace and safety. He
could have, for instance, conceded an obvious theoretical option: peace
and safety in their entirety must give way to a truth that is by necessity a
clear and present danger. Or more nihilistically, Holmes could have as-
serted that although inconsistent with our generally pacific natures,
speech that poses an otherwise unlawful clear and present danger to oth-
ers or to one's self might ultimately represent a truth from the
perspective of the First Amendment's right of free speech. He did nei-
ther and insisted that political change, if necessary, must nonetheless be
peaceful and relatively safe.
A similar preoccupation with peace and safety can be found in
Holmes's collaborator, Justice Louis Brandeis. In Whitney v. California,07
Holmes joined Brandeis's concurrence to articulate a justification for
free speech that, while potentially compatible with the former's, was also
logically distinct. Holmes had stressed a view of truth that was deter-
mined largely through the political process, and hence tended to remain
agnostic about the possibility for moral or intellectual progress. But
Brandeis offered a justification for free speech that was more compatible
with Enlightenment assumptions that greater debate and deliberation
103. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
104. 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
105. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 652, 673.
106. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 652, 673.
107. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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would lead to better ideas about what was true and desirable in politics.
He drew much of his support from a kind of originalism where he por-
trayed the framers as bracing defenders of the pursuit of truth: "Those
who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did
not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of lib-
erty. 108 That may be so, but Brandeis never claims that they did not fear
violence and that they had exalted liberty at the cost of order, either.
Despite his glowing support for free speech, Brandeis, like Holmes,
appears to treat peace and safety as nonnegotiable. Even when Brandeis
says that "[f]ear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly" and that "[o]nly an emergency can justify repres-
sion," he seems to imply that a fear of an emergency involving serious
injury can justify to limit the right of free speech.1°9 Paradoxically,
Brandeis also suggests that physical safety is not just the limit of free
speech but also a prerequisite for its existence, for free speech and the
idealized deliberation which it sometimes presupposes were impossible
where "[m]en feared witches and burnt women. " °
The same nonnegotiable commitment to peace and safety inform
the most celebrated contemporary justification for free speech in Bran-
denburg v. Ohio."' There, the Court announced in a matter-of-fact tone
that it was applying the traditional clear and present danger test, but the
formulation presented a significant departure from the past. The Court
stated that:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action."2
Despite the unprecedented protection for speech afforded by Branden-
burg, the Court, as its language suggests, never subordinated peace and
safety for freedom of speech and whatever rewards that may derive from
it.
108. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.
109. Brandeis writes that there "must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent." Whitney, 274 U.S. 376 (1927). And speech may be re-
stricted for Brandeis if "the evil apprehended is relatively serious." Whitney, 274 U.S.
377 (1927).
110. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376.
111. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
112. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
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B. Fighting Words and Group Libel
The Supreme Court's fighting words doctrine, like its clear and pre-
sent danger test, represents a classic liberal commitment to peace and
safety. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, Justice Murphy announced the
Court's initial formulation of the fighting words doctrine." He stated:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These in-
clude the lewd and obscene,. . . and the insulting or "fighting"
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
ity.114
To these words, Justice Murphy also quoted with approval the lan-
guage from the lower state court:
The statute [under which Chaplinsky was prosecuted] ...
does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly
likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee, words
whose speaking constitutes a breach of the peace by the
speaker-including "classical fighting words," words in current
use less "classical" but equally likely to cause violence, and
other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and
threats. 5
While the Court's language in Chaplinsky left ambiguous several ques-
tions, one thing remained relatively clear: peace and safety were
nonnegotiable.
Conventionally regarded as a case of group libel, Beauharnais v. Il-
linois"6 is better understood as animated by the concern for peace and
safety announced in Chaplinsky. Beauharnais, the president of a white
supremacist group, was passing out leaflets in Chicago urging the city's
113. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
114. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
115. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
116. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
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mayor and city council "to halt the further encroachment, harassment
and invasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods and per-
sons, by the Negro."'" 7 The leaflet also stated that "[i]f persuasion and
the need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the
Negro will not unite us, then the aggressions ... rapes, robberies,
knives, guns and marijuana of the negro surely will.""18 Illinois prose-
cuted Beauharnais for distributing literature that "portrays depravity,
criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race,
color, creed or religion, which exposes the citizens of any race, color,
creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is produc-
tive of breach of the peace or riots.""9
Justice Frankfurter for the Court began with what appeared a dis-
cussion about libel. He explained that "[n]o one will gainsay that it is
libelous falsely to charge another with being a rapist, robber, carrier of
knives and guns, and user of marijuana."'2 The question remained
whether the Constitution permitted a state from libel "directed at desig-
nated collectivities and flagrantly disseminated."1 21 Justice Frankfurter
answered that "if an utterance directed at an individual may be the ob-
ject of criminal sanctions, we cannot deny to a State power to punish
the same utterance directed at a defined group.' ' 122 These formal refer-
ences to libel, however, did not seem to be at the heart of Justice
Frankfurter's opinion. He focused instead on the potential for racist
statements to spark civil unrest:
Illinois did not have to look beyond her own borders or await
the tragic experience of the last decades to conclude that will-
ful purveyors of falsehood concerning racial and religious
groups promote strife .... From the murder of the abolitionist
Lovejoy in 1837 to the Cicero riots of 1951, Illinois has been
the scene of exacerbated tension between races, often flaring
into violence and destruction. In many of these outbreaks, ut-
terances of the character here in question, so the Illinois
legislature could conclude, played a significant part.
117. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 252.
118. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 252.
119. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 271.
120. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 257-58.
121. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258.
122. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258.
20081
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6& LAW
In the face of this history and its frequent obligato of extreme
racial and religious propaganda, we would deny experience to
say that the Illinois legislature was without reason in seeking
ways to curb false or malicious defamation of racial and reli-
gious groups, made in public places and by means calculated
to have a powerful emotional impact on those to whom it was
presented .... 123
While the dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Douglas were hostile
to Justice Frankfurter's opinion, the former only disagreed with whether
Beauharnais presented a legitimate danger, not whether being concerned
with such danger was constitutionally justified in the first place. Beau-
harnais, then, like the other cases, seems to stand for the principle that
peace and safety are inviolable.
VI. DEMOCRACY AND TRUTH
In the last section I argued that liberalism as articulated in the exist-
ing case law is dedicated to the protection of people's peace and safety as
an inviolable principle. However, there is more to life than peace and
safety, especially when it comes to free speech. We want speech to fur-
ther commerce, advance science, and enlighten our artistic sensibilities;
less piously, we also want it to titillate, entertain, and thrill us. More
than anything else, however, a liberal society finds the counter-value to
peace and safety in its collective regard for "truth," especially of a politi-
cal nature, and the means to arrive at some truth.125 For the formal
premise of democracy is that the people themselves and not governmen-
tal officials should have the authority to assess competing claims to some
truth in their pursuit of self-government. 12 6 It is not surprising, then,
that legal justifications for pornography rely on this aspiration to protect
the means for arriving at truth.
123. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 261.
124. Black's dissent, which Douglas joined clarified that Chaplinsky's prohibition on fight-
ing words was premised on "insulting words directed at an individual on a public
street." Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 272 (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting). In a separate
dissent, Douglas noted that the "peril of speech must be clear and present, leaving no
room for argument, raising no doubts as to the necessity of curbing speech in order to
prevent disaster .... Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 285 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
125. See infra Parts VIA and VIB.
126. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERN-
MENT (1st ed., Harper Books 1948). See also OWEN Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH
(1998); CAss R SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1995).
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But such justifications are not persuasive, for pornography's only
"truth" is the celebration of a form of violence incompatible with liberal-
ism's premises. The traditional justifications marshaled by those who
defend the sort of pornography that I would submit to punishment are
articulated in two forms. Both forms are formally premised on the noble
idea of democracy whereby people are treated as free and equal to de-
termine truth for themselves without the condescending intervention of
government censorship. The first, which I call the Enlightenment justi-
fication, argues that the First Amendment should permit the expression
of different views and opinions, for through debate and deliberation,
people are likely to arrive at more enlightened conclusions. The second,
which I call the process justification, lacks confidence that people will
reach such ends (assuming they exist as ontological entities) and instead
posits truth as simply a product of the political process whereby people
are treated as though they were free and equal (regardless of whether
they actually are). Both justifications are often employed to support the
view that pornography deserves First Amendment protection, and both
are sometimes carelessly conflated with liberalism. But both justifica-
tions merely prove that pornography's content is utterly hostile to
liberalism's commitment to peace and safety.
A. The EnlightenmentJustification
The Enlightenment justification for the First Amendment right of
free speech is premised on the view that people are equal and free to
judge political arguments for themselves. I append the term Enlighten-
ment to evoke its formal faith in the reasoning powers of human beings
and their potential for improving themselves and society through the
habits of sober deliberation. Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California27 is the first sustained instantiation in the Supreme
Court of the Enlightenment view. Endorsing an originalist interpreta-
tion of the Constitution, he argued that those:
who won our independence believed that the final end of the
state was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that
in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over
the arbitrary.... They believed that freedom to think as you
127. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
2008]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth.
12 8
There are anomalies here: men who are free and equal seeking vindica-
tion from their mythic ancestors, and the Enlightenment's bland
universalist principles heavily sweetened with American patriotic syrup.
But perhaps Brandeis's main purpose was less analytic and more aspira-
tional in trying to efficiently enlist support for the premise that people
are or should be considered free and equal in their right of free speech.
For a more developed defense, we need to look elsewhere.
Mill's arguments are a good place to begin. As the Enlightenment
justification's most conscripted philosophical workhorse, Mill justified
free speech along three principal lines, underwriting all three with the
assumption that people are free and equal to contribute to a collective
understanding of some truth.
He claimed that "though the silenced opinion be an error, it may,
and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the gen-
eral or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole
truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder
of the truth has any chance of being supplied."129 Such democratization
of epistemic authority-of who is entitled to determine what is the
truth-seems entirely apt to facilitate criticisms of governmental offi-
cials, clerics, and others who wield, and thus can abuse, uncommon
power over others including in matters related to the production of
truth. Yet more opaque is what is to be gained for truth by pornography
that shows women as people, in the words of Dworkin and
MacKinnon's proposed statute, "who experience sexual pleasure in being
raped," or "as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or
physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or sev-
ered into body parts."'3 How can such images, and the kind of social
world they celebrate, form a truthful idea of who women really are?
How can Mill's justification, situated as it is in a belief in reason, equal-
ity, and freedom, lead to such disturbingly unreasonable, unequal, and
oppressive speech?
Mill's other justification for speech seems to fare no better in the
case of pornography. He had stated that "even if the received opinion be
not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actu-
ally is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who
receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehen-
128. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
129. MILL, supra note 61, at 53.
130. Indianapolis Code § 16-3(q).
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sion or feeling of its rational grounds."'' 1 Yet it would seem that we
hardly need reminding that murdering and raping women are wrong (a
world in which we did might be imaginable, but just barely so). On the
other hand, while the empirical evidence is not conclusive, there are
probably some men who are stimulated to commit violence against
women partly because of such images. While pornography's harm
against women cannot be exactly calibrated, its potential would seem to
outweigh whatever ambiguous victories are being claimed for truth.
There is one last argument that Mill offers. He states that the
"meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfee-
bled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the
dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but
cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heart-
felt conviction, from reason or personal experience. '132 But there is
already overwhelming news coverage of women being raped and as-
saulted. Do we really need to see it done with sadistic glee before we
recognize that we should pass laws against it and condemn those who
engage in it?
Mill, like Brandeis, applauds the view that all are equally free to
express and assess arguments. But their justifications, taken straight-
forwardly, lead to conclusions that are surprisingly disturbing and,
worse, threaten to unravel the very premise that people are in fact
equal and free in their capacities to make responsible political deci-
sions for themselves. The Enlightenment justification tends to conflate
or obscure the distinction between the normative insistence that peo-
ple should be considered equally free to assess speech and the factual
conclusion that they actually are. If the latter is not the case, there need
to be persuasive reasons for insisting that we accept the fiction of the
former; unfortunately, such reasons appear lacking in Mill and
Brandeis.
Things do not improve much with contemporaries like Professor
David Richards. He explains:
In opposition to the Victorian view, which rigidly defines
proper sexual function in a way analogous to ideas of
excremental regularity and moderation, pornography offers an
alternative model of plastic variety and joyful excess in
sexuality. In opposition to the Catholic dismissal of sexuality
as an unfortunate and spiritually superficial concomitant of
propagation, pornography affords an alternative idea of the
131. MILL, supra note 61, at 53.
132. Id. at 53-54.
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independent status of sexuality as a profound ecstasy that may
sustain intimate bonding between persons. Pornography, on
this view of it, is a just vehicle for the liberation of starved and
shriveled capacities of sexual imagination and experience in
the service of moral powers engaged in the construction of
more fulfilling and humane personal relationships.133
On Professor Richards's account, people are free and equal to explore
and realize their sexual identities by exercising their right of freedom of
speech. Like Brandeis's and Mill's justifications, Richards's justification
for self-fulfillment seems optimistic that people, if regarded as free and
equal, will likely arrive at better conclusions-understood as "more ful-
filling and humane personal relationships"-through free speech than if
they were subject to paternal governmental regulations. Yet, like
Brandeis and Mill, Richards also appears unduly hopeful. While he
chooses to celebrate the "joyful excess" of pornography against a crusty
Catholic prudishness, he tends to skirt the question of pornography's
potentially destructive tendencies. Far from contributing to "more ful-
filling and humane personal relationships," pornography could very well
lead to opposite outcomes: a vicious misogyny, a pathology of isolation
and voyeurism, and an obsession with sex as an extension of violence. By
treating people as though they were all free and equal to view and in-
dulge whatever they please in the name of self-fulfillment, we also leave
some to their worst devices.
But if Richards, Mill and Brandeis should be consumed by buoyant
optimism, the other prominent justification for treating people as free
and equal with regard to their right of speech slouches aloof with a hard
boiled indifference to outcome while mesmerized by a belief in political
process, and I accordingly call it the process justification.
B. The Process Justification
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Brandeis's frequent intellectual partner,
articulates the earliest Supreme Court version of the process justifica-
tion. In Abrams v. United States,"4 he writes:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
133. RicHARDs, supra note 59, at 206-07.
134. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
135
out.
The marketplace metaphor is splendidly evocative, for silently under-
writing it is the assumption familiar to the marketplace that all people
are free and equal to buy or reject arguments like goods for sale, as they
see fit, without the government's paternal intervention. Here, the peo-
ple's freedom and equality to assess political arguments are limited
mainly by their own preferences and the institutional force of majori-
tarian politics.
Sadly missing from such a muscular endorsement of the democratic
process is an explanation for why Holmes thinks it is better to permit
people-even if ignorant, confused, prejudiced, and violently misogy-
nistic-to decide the nation's future as ostensibly free and equal beings.
While we may permit people in the marketplace to choose whatever
they wish for themselves as individuals, we would need more justification
for why consumers in the political marketplace should be permitted,
based on what they hear and read (or fail to hear and read), to choose
for others their political fates. Holmes does not explain whether people
actually possess the sensibilities to be considered free and equal to each
other. He is content with the mere assertion, which follows easily and
tautologically from his unjustified premise that the "best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market."'36
This remarkable trust in the people coupled with an indifference to
the outcome of the democratic process holds court in Easterbrook's
opinion in the case where he struck down Dworkin and MacKinnon's
statute, American Booksellers:
John Stewart [sic] Mill's On Liberty defend[s] freedom of
speech on the ground that the truth will prevail, and many of
the most important cases under the First Amendment recite
this position. The Framers undoubtedly believed it. ... But
the Constitution does not make the dominance of truth a nec-
essary condition of freedom of speech. To say that it does
135. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
136. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J.,dissenting).
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would be to confuse an outcome of free speech with a neces-
sary condition for the application of the amendment.' 7
At one point, Easterbrook, far from prohibiting pornography's influence
on men's psyches, wants to reward its potency. Responding to empirical
findings of pornography's dangerous effects, he says flatly that "this sim-
ply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech." 3'
There is a serious flaw with the process justification, however.
Easterbrook congratulates American democracy with the following ob-
servation: "Totalitarian governments today rule much of the planet,
practicing suppression of billions and spreading dogma that may enslave
others. One of the things that separates our society from theirs is our
absolute right to propagate opinions that the government finds wrong or
even hateful." '139 The conceit here is that treating people, including por-
nographers, as free and equal to exercise their right of free speech will
ensure the freedom and equality of others, including women. But
Easterbrook provides nothing to ensure that pacific and neutral result.
Indeed, the very premise that people are free and equal, by logically
permitting them to light upon any number of political designs including
rabidly anti-democratic ones, can lead to its own destruction. If the mi-
sogyny that is visually endorsed in pornography manages to convince
enough people of the sanity and rightness of its viewpoint, surely, at that
time, women will no longer be able to speak and listen as free and equal
beings. Easterbrook warns us that pornography must be protected, for
"[a]ny other answer leaves the government in control of all of the insti-
tutions of culture, the great censor and director of which thoughts are
good for us."' 4 Unbeknownst to Easterbrook, there is a thorny irony in
this conclusion: leaving pornographers who glorify the murder and rape
of women the opportunity to enlist public opinion in its mad cause
would also lead to a world where the government is "the great censor
and director of which thoughts are good for us" (and much worse).
Notwithstanding Easterbrook's claims, the conflict is not properly one
between the "government" and "us," for the government often acts at
our behest, censoring speech that we hate. That is the unpleasant lesson
gleaned from, among others, the Espionage Act of 1917"4' and the
Smith Act, 42 both attempts by the public to squelch dissident views.
137. 771 F.2d at 330.
138. Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 329.
139. Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 328.
140. Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 330.
141. Espionage Act, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (repealed 1948).
142. Smith Act, 54 Star. 670 (1940) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1946)).
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Easterbrook's warning about empowering a totalitarian government has
not quelled the threat of a world where people are denied their equality
and freedom; he has merely delayed its gratification.
The process justification, like the Enlightenment justification, is
founded on the assumption that people are free and equal and the aspi-
ration that they will continue to enjoy a governmental regime that
respects them as such. However, this assumption can theoretically lead
to speech that, if persuasive enough, will demolish the regime that its
advocates appear to treasure and whose existence is asserted to be un-
derwritten by the assumption, a possibility that curiously raises no
eyebrows, let alone a sustained defense, among the process justification's
advocates.
VII. VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY Is NOT NEUTRAL
Thus far, I have argued that pornography, from the perspective of
liberalism, lacks any redeeming values for truth and that it presents an
unjustified threat to peace and safety. This argument might encounter
the familiar objection offered by pornography's defenders. They will ar-
gue that such criticisms of pornography smack of "viewpoint
discrimination" by punishing the viewpoints of pornographers, and
hence constitutes a presumptive violation of the First Amendment. But
this objection is not effective. For the law, as a hierarchy of values, inevi-
tably and incessantly engages in forms of viewpoint discrimination,
something that I can illustrate by turning to the viewpoint objection
itself as articulated by pornography's defenders.
The best example probably comes from Easterbrook's majority
opinion in American Booksellers, where he struck down the pornography
legislation drafted by MacKinnon and Dworkin.'43 The statute, as I have
stated before, defined "pornography" as "the graphic sexually explicit
subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words .... ,,144 What
provoked Easterbrook's ire was the statute's claim that pornography was
not protected speech because of its propensity to dehumanize women
and make them culturally available as objects of contempt and male vio-
lence, a maneuver that defiantly challenged the Supreme Court's limited
protection of pornography outside of the legal category of obscenity.
45
In other words, for Easterbrook, the statute was an unforgivable example
of viewpoint discrimination.
143. Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d 323.
144. Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 324.
145. Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 324-25, 328.
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While pornography and obscenity sometimes overlap as a legal
matter, they are, for Easterbrook, conceptually distinct. 116 In Miller v.
California, the Supreme Court stated that obscenity receives no First
Amendment protection, with obscenity understood as material that,
according to community standards, is patently offensive, appeals to pru-
rient interests, and taken as a whole, lacks any serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value."' What troubled Easterbrook was that the
anti-pornography statute failed to acknowledge the redemptive proper-
ties afforded by the work's literary and other values nor even cared
whether the speech was patently offensive or prurient, focusing exclu-
sively as it did on the material's harmfulness to women.' And in doing
this, the statute thus represented for him a dangerous example of the
government's discrimination against a particular viewpoint regarding sex
and gender:
Under the ordinance graphic sexually explicit speech is "por-
nography" or not depending on the perspective the author
adopts. Speech that "subordinates" women and also, for exam-
ple, presents women as enjoying pain, humiliation, or rape, or
even simply presents women in "positions of servility or sub-
mission or display" is forbidden, no matter how great the
literary or political value of the work taken as a whole. Speech
that portrays women in positions of equality is lawful, no mat-
ter how graphic the sexual content.149
Such discrimination leads, for Easterbrook, to an appalling conclu-
sion:
This is thought control. It establishes an "approved" view of
women, of how they may react to sexual encounters, of how
the sexes may relate to each other. Those who espouse the ap-
proved view may use sexual images; those who do not, may
150
not.
To permit such outright viewpoint discrimination would leave "the gov-
ernment in control of all of the institutions of culture, the great censor
and director of which thoughts are good for us."'5 1
146. Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 324-25.
147. Millerv. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).
148. Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 324-25, 328.
149. Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 328.
150. Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 328.
151. Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 330.
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TAKING SAFETY SERIOUSLY
While the structure and content of Easterbrook's position may
seem satisfactory according to conventional legal reasoning, his entire
argument actually undermines the very premises that it takes inordinate
care to establish. Easterbrook commits himself to the stark premise that
you can confidently distinguish obscenity from pornography; that is, he
commits himself to the premise that you can confidently distinguish one
category of speech from another. It is a premise, which as I have shown,
Easterbrook treats with guarded care and dutiful obligation in the be-
ginning, but by the end of his opinion, he is busy at work demolishing
it as logically implausible and politically dangerous. Easterbrook insists
that to punish pornography is to renege on a string of legal precedent
that points decidedly towards its protection. He tells us that pornogra-
phy is protected because Brandenburg v. Ohio says the "ideas of the Klan
may be propagated," because Dejonge v. Oregon says "[c]ommunists may
speak freely and run for office," and because Collin v. Smith says the
"Nazi Party may march through a city with a large Jewish popula-
tion.""'
All of these forms of speech have produced grim effects to be sure;
"the beliefs of Nazis led to the death of millions, those of the Klan to the
repression of millions." ' However, as Easterbrook tells us, we must
keep in mind that "[t]otalitarian governments today rule much of the
planet, practicing suppression of billions and spreading dogma that may
enslave others" 5 and "[o]ne of the things that separates our society from
theirs is our absolute right to propagate opinions that the government
finds wrong or even hateful.""' Here, Easterbrook renounces any ability
to discern the unwanted effects of pornography from the unwanted ef-
fects of speech by the Klan or the Nazis. To make such an exception, he
argues, would surely invite the calamity of censorship and eventually
totalitarianism. Yet the drawing of such a rigid exception is precisely
what Easterbrook does in assigning some forms of speech to the unpro-
tected category of obscenity. He confesses to being at a hopeless loss to
distinguish the speech of the Nazis from those of pornographers but he
is utterly self-assured in his ability to distinguish pornography from ob-
scenity, and hence, in his ability to discern the attendant categories of
literary, artistic, political and scientific speech as well as the category of
prurience. Indeed, Easterbrook at once disclaims any authority to deter-
mine one form of offensive speech from another in racist speech and
pornography, but then knowingly insists that obscenity deserves no
152. Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 328.
153. Am. Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 328.
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constitutional protection because its offensiveness is so obvious. Ulti-
mately, then, he demonstrates why his rejection of the pornography
statute makes no sense: he himself relies on the very technique which he
condemns as logically impossible and politically precarious.
What deserves emphasis in the foregoing analysis of Easterbrook's
opinion is that the blanket prohibition against viewpoint discrimination
is not only unjustified in a normative sense but that it is logically impos-
sible to follow. The proper question, therefore, should not be whether
some legislation is or is not an example of viewpoint discrimination
since anything can be easily described as such. A better question is
whether one instantiation of viewpoint discrimination is more justified
than another, according to some normative standard. To that end, there
should be no constitutional protection for the expression of those view-
points which endorse, either deliberately or implicitly, violence against
women. Such viewpoints are hostile to the most basic enterprise of a
liberal society, which is not to enshrine a muscular individualism or to
maintain epistemic neutrality, but to guarantee the peace and safety of
its members. 56
CONCLUSION
There is often the assumption that liberalism is of no help in fight-
ing against pornography. Liberalism, the argument goes, lacks the
epistemic resources to judge right from wrong or it harbors a naive op-
timism that people are too enlightened to endorse pornography's
destructive messages. I have suggested that these characterizations miss
the most important aspect of liberalism in its commitment to peace and
safety. If we take that commitment seriously, we can help to fashion le-
gal rules that can protect women from the harms of pornography. t
156. Rogers Smith writes that "[a]bove all, early liberals like Locke were concerned to
provide for lasting civil peace and physical security. Every aspect of liberalism finds
part of its motivation in this goal." SMITH, supra note 37, at 18. Smith also explains:
"To a surprising extent, early liberals conceived of popular governance, religious tol-
erance, the rule of law, and other forms of liberty only as means to basic goals. They
also did not equate liberalism with fair legal and constitutional procedures, or with
pursuit of the maximum freedom imaginable, as many modern liberals do. Instead,
liberals originally held that only a specific and limited conception of liberty deserved
to be an end in itself. And they were attached to other specific ends, for which liberty
was a means-essentially peace, prosperity through economic growth, and intellectual
progress." Id. at 14-15.
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